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Politeness principleAlthough forms of address are widely used in textual and other types of
disclosure, empirical evidence of their eﬀects is rare. China provides a unique
setting in which to test the economic consequences of the forms of address used
in audit reports. From 2003 to 2011, about 60% of auditors surveyed addressed
their clients by their real names in audit opinions, while the others used hon-
oriﬁcs. Based on a sample of Chinese audit opinions, I report the following
ﬁndings. First, the announcement of an audit opinion that uses the client’s real
name elicits a greater market response than the announcement of an opinion
featuring an honoriﬁc form of address. Second, the eﬀects of real-name forms
of address are stronger in ﬁrms with weak board governance. Third, the
association between audit fees and audit risk factors, such as loss-making, is
stronger in ﬁrms that are addressed by their real names in audit reports. I
conclude from these ﬁndings that the forms of address used in audit opinions
may reveal private information on audit quality. The results of this study are
consistent with the power-solidarity eﬀect described by sociolinguists.
 2014 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Digital indicators are widely used in ﬁnancial reports to communicate private information. In addition to
numerical information, textual information plays an important role in corporate disclosure. With the devel-
opment of computer technologies, the textual analysis of ﬁnancial reports has become increasingly common
in developed capital markets. However, powerful tools for analyzing textual information are rare in China.
For example, no emotion-mapping dictionary is available for use with Chinese ﬁnancial reports. Therefore,
Chinese audit reports provide a unique opportunity to examine the consequences of diﬀerent forms of address.
Due to the traditional politeness principle embedded in the Chinese language, two main types of address can
be observed in audit opinions. From 2003 to 2011, about 60% of clients surveyed were addressed by their real
248 Z. Zhao /China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 247–261names, while the others were addressed using honoriﬁcs (‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’). The clear distinction between these two
types of address makes it easy to empirically analyze forms of address in Chinese audit opinions.
In ancient China, particular styles of writing were used to communicate political opinions. In a classic text
entitled Chun qiu, Confucius used subtle words to convey profound meanings. The aim of this research was to
determine whether auditors select forms of address to disclose speciﬁc information about audit quality. I test
two hypotheses, based respectively on the theories of audit quality and sociolinguistic theory. I ﬁnd that audit
opinions that address clients by their real names yield greater market returns than opinions featuring honoriﬁc
forms of address. I also ﬁnd that the eﬀects of forms of address are more pronounced in ﬁrms with weak board
governance. Finally, the relationship between audit fees and audit risk factors, such as loss-making, is stronger
in ﬁrms addressed by their real names in audit opinions than ﬁrms addressed using honoriﬁcs. Viewed
collectively, these ﬁndings suggest that independent auditors have a greater incentive to address clients by their
real names. The results are consistent with the power-solidarity eﬀect described by sociolinguists.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it provides further evidence on textual
disclosure via forms of address. The results show that the rules of the Chinese language aﬀect communication
between a company and its investors. Second, the ﬁndings of this paper suggest that investors distinguish
between ‘clean’ opinions by textual diﬀerences, as the imperative of client conﬁdentiality prevents potential
investors from viewing unaudited ﬁnancial reports. This conclusion may shed light on the insuﬃciency of
information in the existing audit-report system. Finally, the results of the study indicate that digital indicators
such as board independence are related to the consequences of textual information, suggesting that textual and
numerical information interact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the
topic under study, such as a review of the relevant literature in the ﬁelds of audit quality and sociolinguistics.
In Section 3, I describe the study’s methodology, with attention to the research sample and model. Section 4
provides the results of tests of the consequences of diﬀerent forms of address. I conclude the paper with a
summary of the ﬁndings and their implications for future research.
2. Address forms in audit reports: background and relation to past research
Despite important research on the information content of English-language text, evidence of the eﬀects of
forms of address is rare. China provides a unique setting in which to analyze the forms of address used in audit
reports. I propose that auditors’ choice of address aﬀects the market reaction to audit reports. This hypothesis
is based on three assumptions. First, as an unaudited ﬁnancial report cannot be observed by investors,
auditors have an incentive to reveal information on audit quality. Second, common guidelines for modes of
address are accepted by all stakeholders in China’s capital market. Third, there is some variation in the forms
of address used in audit reports, due to power-related motives and the Chinese tradition of polite language.
2.1. Are all clean opinions the same?
I focus on clean opinions because they are not diﬀerentiated by numerical information. The audit quality of
a client ﬁrm that receives a clean opinion depends on the quality of the client’s unaudited ﬁnancial report.
However, investors cannot observe unaudited ﬁnancial reports, due to client conﬁdentiality. Auditors issue
clean opinions to three types of clients. Firms in the ﬁrst category receive clean opinions in return for high-
quality unaudited reports. Second, ﬁrms that oﬀer poor-quality unaudited reports but accept all of their audi-
tors’ suggestions for adjustment also receive clean opinions. Firms of the third type, which oﬀer poor-quality
reports and refuse to make all of the adjustments proposed by auditors, receive clean opinions only if the risk
of litigation is low. Clearly, the audit quality of the second type of ﬁrm is higher than that of the third type.
However, it is diﬃcult to evaluate the audit quality of ﬁrms in the ﬁrst category. Investors cannot diﬀerentiate
between ﬁrms that receive clean opinions in return for high-quality reports because the audit service is unob-
servable. Some researchers argue that auditors are under pressure to issue unmodiﬁed opinions because mod-
iﬁed opinions have a huge negative eﬀect on clients (Sun and Wang, 1999; Zhao, 2007; Simunic and Wu,
2009). However, other researchers point out that auditors have an incentive to circumvent pressure from inves-
tors and regulators, and thus engage in collaborative governance with independent directors (Zhao and Zhou,
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I hypothesize that auditors issuing clean opinions and oﬀering high-quality services have an incentive to reveal
information to the market. Therefore, diﬀerent types of clean opinion have distinct consequences.
2.2. Information-conveying function of corporate textual disclosure
Several aspects of textual disclosure, such as readability, tone and keyword frequency, are subject to man-
agers’ discretion. According to past research, managers’ reporting incentives aﬀect the consequences of textual
disclosure. First, the short-term market returns to an earnings-release announcement are positively related to
the level of optimism conveyed in the textual content of the earnings-release report (Henry, 2008; Demers and
Vega, 2011; Davis et al., 2012). Loughran and McDonnald (2011) ﬁnd a similar association between market
returns and optimism in the text of 10-K Securities and Exchange Commission ﬁlings. Second, the level of
optimism expressed in an earnings report is positively associated with future market returns (Feldman
et al., 2009). Third, De Franco et al. (2011) ﬁnd a positive relationship between the readability of analysts’
reports and the stock-turnover rate. Finally, Loughran and McDonnald (2011) ﬁnd evidence to suggest that
the trading volume of small investors is positively associated with the readability of their annual reports.
Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that textual disclosure provides investors with private information.
Merkley (2011) ﬁnds that when a company’s ﬁnancial performance is in decline, its management is likely to
disclose more information on research and development in the text of ﬁnancial reports to assure the market of
the long-term value of the company. Second, Nelson and Pritchard (2007) ﬁnd that the greater the litigation
risk faced by a ﬁrm, the more cautionary language managers use. Third, the mispricing of changes of accruals
is larger when a ﬁrm discloses more information on competition in its annual report (Li et al., 2011).
It is worth mentioning that managers are also likely to provide obfuscatory information when ﬁrm perfor-
mance declines. As demonstrated by Li (2008), ﬁrms with more complicated annual reports have less persistent
positive earnings. Consistent with this result, Tama-Sweet (2009) ﬁnds that managers release more optimistic
information when they plan to exercise their stock options, suggesting an opportunistic incentive for textual
reporting.
2.3. Analysis based on theories of sociolinguistics and audit quality
Audit quality is traditionally believed to depend on auditors’ competence and independence (DeAngelo,
1981). Clearly, investors will respond to textually disclosed information on auditor competence or auditor
independence. As shown by sociolinguists, people use language to deﬁne their relationships with others.
The term ‘forms of address’ denotes the words used by speakers to designate the people with whom they
are talking. Such words can be used to communicate information about the relationship between speaker
and addressee. Ervin-Tripp (1972) proposes that an address system is composed of a series of choices made
by speakers. For example, a faculty member who wishes to address the dean by his ﬁrst name will check
whether expectations of status marking exist before using this form of address. The relative formality of
the relationship between the faculty member and the dean will also aﬀect the former’s choice of address.
Zhang (2009) posits that in China, choices of forms of address are driven by psychological as well as cultural
factors. Accordingly, the authors of Chinese literary works use distinct forms of address to convey particular
information.
2.3.1. Power-solidarity eﬀect and politeness principle
Two sociolinguistic theories help to explain the consequences of diﬀerent forms of address in audit opin-
ions. The ﬁrst is the power-solidarity theory suggested by Brown and Gilman (1960), according to which
the use of real-name forms of address represents a relationship of equal power between auditor and client.
Based on this assumption, I hypothesize that the use of real names in audit opinions indicates a greater degree
of auditor independence. The second useful sociolinguistic theory is the politeness principle proposed by
Brown and Levinson (1978), who suggest that speakers use honoriﬁcs to address people of higher status.
Accordingly, auditors may use honoriﬁc forms to suggest that clients are important. Although investors
respond positively to both auditor independence and client importance, an event study may help to determine
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higher than those on audit opinions with honoriﬁc forms of address, the power-solidarity eﬀect can be
assumed to be more pronounced in Chinese audit opinions. However, if there is no diﬀerence in the market
returns on these two types of address, it can be assumed either that the power-solidarity eﬀect and the
politeness principle are non-existent, or that these two eﬀects are evenly matched and cancel each other
out. The full set of permutations leading to these results is presented in the following ﬁgure (see Fig. 1).
‘Auditor independence’ refers to the likelihood of auditors reporting a breach in its client’s accounting sys-
tem. The theoretical probability of reporting a breach usually decreases in practice, because a client can
impose costs on an auditor by terminating the audit service. Therefore, auditor independence is assumed to
be positively related to characteristics such as audit size (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). ‘Opinion shopping’
describes the practice of searching for an auditor willing to comply with the client’s needs by issuing an
unqualiﬁed opinion. This phenomenon is of concern to both regulators and investors. Investors require
information on auditor independence to evaluate a ﬁrm’s audit quality, even when the ﬁrm has received a
clean opinion. I hypothesize that auditors’ choice of forms of address provides information on auditor inde-
pendence, for two reasons. First, forms of address are of concern to clients when auditors issue clean opinions.
Second, sociolinguistic theories suggest that diﬀerent forms of address reﬂect diﬀerent relationships between
clients and auditors.
Brown and Gilman (1960) propose that pronoun usage is governed by power and solidarity semantics.
Brown and Ford (1961) identify a natural progression in the forms of address chosen by English speakers from
mutual title with ﬁrst name to mutual ﬁrst name, indicating that power diﬀerences between levels of society are
less important in modern social interactions. According to Scotton and Zhu (1983), honoriﬁcs such as ‘lo shı¯’
(‘teacher’) were retained in Chinese forms of address after 1949. Such honoriﬁc titles convey respect for the
addressee, indicating that power diﬀerence is still important in China. With the development of China, the
popularity of honoriﬁc titles continues to depreciate and addresses based on the solidarity eﬀect, such as ‘to´ng
zhı`’ (comrade), are supported by the government. As discussed in these literatures, I expect that real name
address suggests a smaller power diﬀerential between auditor and client. I also hypothesize that the more bal-
anced the auditor–client relationship, the more independent the auditor is likely to be.
In China, words such as ‘guı`’ (‘esteemed’) are used in honoriﬁc forms of address to convey the speaker’s
respect. For example, the Chinese word ‘guı` xı`ng’ means ‘your esteemed name’ in English. In contrast, words
such as ‘b’ are used in self-abasing forms of address. For example, the Chinese word ‘b re´n’ means ‘your hum-
ble friend’ in English. Both honoriﬁcs and self-abasing forms of address can positively aﬀect face, which is
consistent with the politeness principle proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978). Therefore, I hypothesize thatSociolinguistics  
----
----
Audit-quality 
factors ------
------
Which form of address is more 
appropriate? 
Power-solidarity 
effect 
Independence 
of auditor 
If the real-name form is more 
appropriate, the power- solidarity effect 
dominates. 
Politeness principle Importance of 
client 
If an honorific form is more 
appropriate, the politeness principle 
dominates. 
If the two forms are equally 
appropriate, either (1) the 
power-solidarity effect and the 
politeness principle are both 
non-existent or (2) the two effects are 
evenly matched and cancel each other 
out. 
Figure 1. Paths leading to three possible sets of results of the event study.
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An important client is likely to elicit greater eﬀort from an auditor, leading to higher audit quality.
2.3.2. Forms of address in China: tradition and modernity
Changes in forms of address in China, whether arising from cultural, commercial or historical
developments, may have important organizational consequences. The authors of Chun qiu, one of the most
famous texts of the Pre-Qin era, used forms of address to express opinions on political events. For example,
when references to the king of Qi are downgraded from ‘qı´ ho´u’ (‘King Qi’) to ‘qı´ re´n’ (‘Guy Qi’), the reader
infers that the king’s behavior is contrary to the welfare of his people.1
In modern China, political and business organizations select forms of address that both maximize the
power-solidarity eﬀect and conform to the politeness principle. For example, when a faculty member wishes
to address his superior, the most common form of address comprises position title and last name. According
to the theory of power solidarity, position titles reveal information on power diﬀerence, and may thus lead to
bureaucratic delay. The local government of Shanghai has released an oﬃcial document that deals speciﬁcally
with forms of address. The General Oﬃce of the Communist Party of China Shanghai Municipal Committee
requires members of the Communist Party, especially party cadres, to address each other as ‘to´ng zhı`’
(‘comrade’) in oﬃcial documents. The government is clearly concerned that forms of address featuring titles
such as ‘secretary’ or ‘minister’ will lead to bureaucratic and organizational ineﬃciencies.
Forms of address are also of concern to commercial organizations. Before 1999, the company Lenovo expe-
rienced steady growth due to its exceptional performance. With the expansion of the company’s management
hierarchy and personnel, the probability of a manager’s being addressed by his or her last name accompanied
by the word ‘zoˇng’ (‘chief oﬃcer’) signiﬁcantly increased. The Chief Executive Oﬃcer of Lenovo, Yuanqin
Yang, was concerned that the company’s cohesion would be compromised by the power eﬀect of this form
of address. He thus established two forms of address for himself: ‘lo ya´ng’ (‘Old Yang’) and his ﬁrst name.
His goal was to eliminate the power eﬀect and create a family culture for the company.2 Huawei, another Chi-
nese company, responded positively to the restructuring of forms of address at Lenovo. A special report was
published in an internal newspaper named ‘Management Optimization’ on the decision to implement Leno-
vo’s reforms at Huawei.3 These two cases indicate that forms of address concern both the government of
China and Chinese companies.
2.4. Research opportunities provided by China
China provides a unique opportunity for textual analysis of the forms of address used in audit opinions for
two reasons. First, the diﬀerence between the two types of address is very clear. Therefore, the variable cap-
turing ‘form of address’ is not ambiguous. In addition, the tests can be conducted in the absence of an emo-
tion-mapping dictionary for the Chinese language. Second, more than 10,000 audit opinions using identiﬁable
forms of address were issued from 2003 to 2011, providing a suﬃciently large sample to capture the whole
market. In addition, the ratio of real names to honoriﬁcs is about 6:4, which allows me to examine not only
the consequences of forms of address, but also the moderating eﬀects of auditor and client characteristics.
2.4.1. Forms of address in Chinese audit opinions
About 90% of China’s listed companies receive standard unqualiﬁed audit opinions. There is no variation
in digital indicators in these opinions, providing a clean setting in which to examine the consequences of dif-
ferent forms of address. The following table provides examples of the forms of address used in Chinese audit
opinions.
As shown in Table 1, the ﬁrst company is addressed by its full name, whereas the second company is
addressed as ‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’ (‘your esteemed company’). In the United States, auditors address their clients1 See Xiong (2007), Spirit of Chinese people in the Spring and Autumn: imperial power and academia in traditional context of China, Xi
an: Shaanxi Normal University General Publishing House Co., Ltd., 105–111.
2 See http://tech.sina.com.cn/news/it/1999-11-1/10141.shtml.
3 See http://iye.net.blog.163.com/blog/static/3148921200861933851979/.
Table 1
Forms of address used in Chinese audit opinions.
Real-name address Honoriﬁc address
To the shareholders of ABC Co., Ltd., To the shareholders of XYZ Co., Ltd.,
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of
ABC and its subsidiaries as of . . .
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of
XYZ [‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’ (‘your esteemed company’)] and its subsidiaries
as of . . .
 Opinion  Opinion
In our opinion, the ﬁnancial statements give a true and fair view of
the ﬁnancial position of ABC Co., Ltd and the Group as of 31
December 2006, and of its ﬁnancial performance and its cash ﬂows
for the year then ended, in accordance with the Accounting
Standards for Business Enterprises and China Accounting System
for Business Enterprises
In our opinion, the ﬁnancial statements give a true and fair view of
the ﬁnancial position of ‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’ (your esteemed company) and
the Group as of 31 December 2006, and of its ﬁnancial performance
and its cash ﬂows for the year then ended, in accordance with the
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and China
Accounting System for Business Enterprises
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as ‘n go¯ng sı¯’ if the politeness principle were neglected, which would have no positive eﬀect on face. Following
the Chinese politeness principle, however, the abbreviation is transformed into an honoriﬁc (‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’).
‘Guı` go¯ng sı¯’ means ‘your esteemed company’ in English. This unique setting enables me to divide forms
of address in Chinese audit opinions into two categories.2.4.2. Distribution of forms of address in China from 2003 to 2011
Before 2003, all auditors addressed their clients using honoriﬁcs (‘guı` go¯ng sı¯’). In 2003, regulators revised
the standards for independent audit and recommended a new style for the text of audit opinions. The guide-
lines on the new standards provide an example of a clean opinion in which a real-name address is used. Forms
of address are thus subject to auditors’ discretion, as this example is provided only for guidance; the use of real
names is not mandatory. Since 2003, two forms of address have been used in Chinese audit opinions. The fol-
lowing table presents the distribution of forms of address since 2003.
As shown in Table 2, the proportion of real-name forms of address increased every year between 2003 and
2009. In 2006, there was a particularly substantial increase in the relative use of real-name forms of address.
However, the proportion of honoriﬁc addresses has ﬂuctuated around the 30% level since 2006. On average,
the audit opinions that use honoriﬁcs account for approximately one third of the full sample. Thus, it is clear
that real names were favored by auditors during the research period.2.4.3. Forms of address in audit opinions: habit or choice?
If auditors never change the style in which they address their clients, the variation in address forms may be
driven by habit rather than choice. To rule out this possibility, I conduct several tests of the distribution of
forms of address. Table 3 presents the distribution by year and CPA ﬁrm. The results indicate that aboutTable 2
Distribution of forms of address used by certiﬁed public accounting (CPA) ﬁrms from 2003 to 2011.
Year Honoriﬁc % Real name %
2003 558 52.00 515 48.00
2004 555 51.68 519 48.32
2005 561 49.73 567 50.27
2006 414 35.00 769 65.00
2007 399 31.79 856 68.21
2008 434 30.52 988 69.48
2009 435 29.71 1029 70.29
2010 524 32.35 1096 67.65
2011 506 27.16 1357 72.84
Total 4386 36.30 7696 63.70
The frequency statistics are based on the full set of usable observations obtained in the event study.
Table 3
Proportion of real-name forms of address used by CPA ﬁrms during the sample period.
Proportion of real-name forms of address Frequency Percentage Cumulative frequency Cumulative percentage
0 70 12.37 70 12.37
0–33% 74 13.07 144 25.44
33–66% 112 19.79 256 45.23
66–100% 171 30.21 427 75.44
100% 139 24.56 566 100.00
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year. Next, I check the distribution of forms of address by CPA ﬁrm and the ﬁrst-signing auditor. Of the 2,659
resulting observations, 586 use diﬀerent forms of address, which accounts for 22% of the sample. Deﬁning an
auditor as the ﬁrst-signing auditor in a CPA ﬁrm in a year gives 6025 observations, of which 587 use diﬀerent
forms of address during the sample period. The results indicate that the variation in forms of address is at least
partly driven by auditor choice. Table 3 also reveals that 12% of the CPA ﬁrms solely used honoriﬁcs in their
opinions between 2003 and 2011, which may indicate that variation in forms of address is partly driven by
auditors’ habits. These habit-driven observations weaken the diﬀerence between the consequences of the
two forms of address.3. Research methodology
3.1. Research model
As discussed in the previous section, I hypothesize that the market reaction to audit opinions using clients’
real names is higher if the power-solidarity eﬀect dominates. To test my hypothesis, I build the following
model to examine the consequences of forms of address.CAR½3;3 ¼ b0 þ b1ARF þ b2UE þ b3SIZE þ biINDUSTRY þ bjYEAR
CAR[3, 3] denotes the market response to the announcement of an audit opinion over the short-term window
of [3, 3]. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using either the market model (RCAR[3, 3]) or
market-adjusted returns (ACAR[3, 3]). The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is as follows.DR ¼ aþ bMRþ e
where DR denotes ﬁrms’ daily returns including the reinvestment of cash dividends. MR denotes the tradable
value-weighted daily market returns including reinvestment of cash dividends. Both items are extracted from
the China Stock Market Accounting Research database. I estimate beta over 120 trading days before the event
window. Observations are deleted if the adjusted R2 of the market model is negative.
ARF is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an auditor addresses the client by its real name, and 0
otherwise. Thus, b1 is designed to capture the consequences of forms of address. If the power-solidarity eﬀect
dominates, b1 is expected to be signiﬁcantly positive. Conversely, b1 is expected to be signiﬁcantly negative if
the politeness principle is dominant.
UE denotes change in earnings from t  1 to t divided by total assets, which captures unexpected earnings.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in year t.
Industry and Year are dummy variables to control for industry and year eﬀects.
If the characteristics of auditors or clients aﬀect the choice of the form of address, the coeﬃcient b1 may cap-
ture market returns that are unrelated to the form of address. Therefore, I use the following treatment-eﬀect
model to deal with the potential endogeneity of variable ARF.CAR½3;3 ¼ f ðARF ;UE; SIZEÞ
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where TO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if ﬁrms change their auditors in t, and 0 otherwise. RSB
denotes auditors’ ranking based on clients’ total assets. ROA is the net income in year t divided by total assets
in t  1. LOSS is equal to 1 if a ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in year t, and 0 otherwise. SP is equal to 1 if a ﬁrm’s ROA
lies in the window [0, 0.01], and 0 otherwise. ARTA denotes accounts receivable in year t divided by total
assets in t  1. INVTA is inventory in year t divided by total assets in t  1. GROW denotes the change in
sales from t  1 to t divided by total assets in t  1. BELOW denotes below the line items divided by total
assets in t  1. OCFTA signiﬁes net cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by total assets in t  1. STATE
is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is a state-owned company, and 0 otherwise. DINDEP is equal to 1 if the proportion of
independent directors to all members of the board is higher than 1/3, and 0 otherwise. COM is equal to 1 if a
ﬁrm sets up all four committees, and 0 otherwise. DE is the debt to asset ratio.
To determine whether the information conveyed in forms of address is related to corporate governance, I
build the following model to examine the moderating eﬀects of DINDEP and COM on the consequences of
forms of address. As noted in the previous paragraph, DINDEP and COM capture ﬁrms’ board quality. A
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient of DINDEP*ARF or COM*ARF indicates that the market returns to audit
opinions in which clients are addressed by their real names are higher when corporate governance is weak.CAR½3;3 ¼ f ðAFR;DINDEP ;DINDEP  AFR;COM ;COM  AFR;UE; SIZEÞ
Finally, I use the following model to test the eﬀects of forms of address on the relationship between audit
fees and corporate risk factors.LFEE ¼ f ðAFR;RISK;RISK  AFR;ControlVariablesÞ
Here, LFEE is the natural logarithm of audit fees in year t. LOSS, SP, ARTA, BELOW and OCFTA are
corporate risk factors. SEO, an auditor risk factor, is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ﬁrms whose returns on
equity are in the range [0.06, 0.065]. Past research has shown that all of these six risk factors are of concern for
auditors (Zhang et al., 2006; Wu, 2012; Zhu and Sun, 2012).3.2. Sample and data
My sample is composed of Chinese audit reports issued between 2003 and 2011. I focus solely on clean
opinions because this type of opinion lacks numerical information. Forms of address can be identiﬁed in
13,217 of the observations with complete ﬁnancial data and returns data. Deleting observations with missing
data gives 12,064 observations that can be used to test the research hypotheses. The sample size is smaller
when the expected market return is based on the market model, because observations with a negative adjusted
R2 from the CAPM are deleted. Data on most of the research variables are available from the China Stock
Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. I use 10,101 observations to test the audit-fee model.
Approximately 2000 ﬁrm-year audit-fee observations are missing from the CSMAR database. The data on
address forms are collected manually from annual reports.
Finally, I winsorize each continuous variable by year in the top and bottom 1% to remove the eﬀect of
potential outliers. The outlier-adjusted descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.
As shown in Table 4, the mean value of ARF is 0.637, which indicates that over 60% of the companies are
addressed by their real names in audit opinions. In addition, the mean value of SP is 0.13, indicating that more
than 10% of Chinese ﬁrms make a small proﬁt.4. Empirical results
4.1. Consequences of forms of address
The observed market responses to diﬀerent forms of address are presented in Table 5. The results indicate
that ARF is positively related to both types of cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting that the market
returns to audit opinions that address companies by their real names are higher than those that use honoriﬁc
Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Variable n Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev.
ACAR[3, 3] 12,064 0.339 1.056 0.001 0.008 0.087
RCAR[3, 3] 11,969 0.344 0.618 0.002 0.008 0.084
LFEE 10,101 11.918 15.664 13.173 13.122 0.583
ARF 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.637 1.000 0.481
UE 12,064 0.404 0.373 0.002 0.003 0.054
TO 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.183 0.000 0.387
RSB 12,064 1.000 71.000 21.801 18.000 15.049
ROA 12,064 0.184 0.560 0.049 0.038 0.071
LOSS 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.080 0.000 0.272
SP 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.128 0.000 0.334
ARTA 12,064 0.000 0.619 0.118 0.088 0.112
INVTA 12,064 0.000 1.496 0.207 0.152 0.209
GROW 12,064 0.666 4.083 0.150 0.085 0.343
BELOW 12,064 0.000 0.262 0.018 0.010 0.025
OCFTA 12,064 0.353 0.574 0.059 0.055 0.107
STATE 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.622 1.000 0.485
DINDEP 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.386 0.000 0.487
COM 12,064 0.000 1.000 0.685 1.000 0.465
DE 12,064 0.036 0.955 0.488 0.501 0.197
SIZE 12,064 19.061 27.071 21.618 21.448 1.227
ACAR[3, 3] denotes the cumulative abnormal return in the window [3, 3], based on market-adjusted returns.
RCAR[3, 3] denotes the cumulative abnormal return in the window [3, 3], based on the capital asset pricing model.
ARF is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the auditor addresses the client by its real name, and 0 otherwise.
UE denotes a change in earnings from t  1 to t divided by total assets in t.
TO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if ﬁrms change their auditors in period t, and 0 otherwise.
RSB denotes an auditor’s ranking based on clients’ total assets.
ROA is net income in year t divided by total assets in t  1.
LOSS is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm suﬀered a loss in year t, and 0 otherwise.
SP is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm’s ROA is in the range [0, 0.01], and 0 otherwise.
ARTA denotes accounts receivable in year t divided by total assets in t  1.
INVTA denotes inventory in year t divided by total assets in t  1.
GROW denotes the change in sales from t  1 to t divided by total assets in t  1.
BELOW denotes below the line items divided by total assets in t  1.
OCFTA denotes net cash ﬂow from operating activities divided by total assets in t  1.
STATE is equal to 1 if the company is a state-owned company, and 0 otherwise.
DINDEP is equal to 1 if independent directors constitute more than a third of the members of the board, and 0 otherwise.
COM is equal to 1 if a ﬁrm sets up all four committees, and 0 otherwise.
DE is the debt to asset ratio.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in t.
Table 5
Economic consequences of forms of address in audit opinions.
ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0012 0.96 0.0280 0.16
ARF 0.0036 0.03 0.0029 0.07
UE 0.0862 0.00 0.0174 0.37
SIZE 0.0010 0.21 0.0024 0.00
n 12,064 11,969
F Test 6.43*** 10.28***
R2 0.0199 0.0338
Industry Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled
The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 6
Treatment-eﬀect model.
ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0239 0.29 0.0451 0.04
ARF 0.0253 0.03 0.0193 0.08
UE 0.0841 0.00 0.0158 0.28
SIZE 0.0017 0.04 0.0029 0.00
LAMBDA 0.0135 0.06 0.0102 0.14
ARF: selection model
Intercept 0.7197 0.02 0.7183 0.03
TO 0.0883 0.01 0.0837 0.01
RSB 0.0113 0.00 0.0114 0.00
ROA 0.9395 0.00 1.0290 0.00
LOSS 0.1130 0.04 0.1166 0.04
SP 0.0465 0.23 0.0441 0.26
ARTA 0.0589 0.66 0.0921 0.49
INVTA 0.1767 0.03 0.1737 0.03
GROW 0.0256 0.57 0.0399 0.39
BELOW 0.5989 0.31 0.4741 0.44
OCFTA 0.1938 0.15 0.1814 0.19
STATE 0.0765 0.01 0.0816 0.00
DINDEP 0.0213 0.39 0.0188 0.45
COM 0.0847 0.00 0.0801 0.01
DE 0.2359 0.00 0.2621 0.00
SIZE 0.0672 0.00 0.0682 0.00
n 12,064 11,969
Wald Chi2 792.24*** 959.53***
Industry Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled
All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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obtain a cumulative abnormal return of 0.3% in the [3, 3] event window. This evidence is consistent with the
power-solidarity eﬀect rather than the politeness principle.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of ARF, I construct a treatment-eﬀect model to determine whether
the results displayed in Table 5 are robust. As shown by the selection model of ARF in Table 6, ARF is pos-
itively related to TO and RSB, which suggests that ﬁrms are more likely to be addressed by their real names
when they change their auditors or their auditors are small CPA ﬁrms. This result also suggests that auditor
characteristics are related to forms of address. For instance, a client is more likely to be addressed by its real
name when the following conditions apply: (1) the client’s return on assets is higher; (2) the client has a larger
inventory; (3) the client is a non-state-owned listed ﬁrm; and (4) the client is smaller. After controlling for
endogeneity, ARF is still signiﬁcantly positive in the returns model, indicating that the results shown in Table 5
are robust.
In addition to enriching the literature on textual disclosure, the ﬁndings have implications for audit stan-
dard setting. For instance, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is now facing a
dilemma: should auditors disclose more information in audit opinions?4 It could be argued that greater dis-
closure is good for investors; however, it may also impose huge costs on auditors. The current study sheds
light on this debate by showing that auditors have an incentive to reveal information in textual diﬀerences,
which is consistent with amendments to audit standards in European audit markets that require more infor-
mation to be disclosed in audit opinions.4 PCAOB Release No. ‘Concept release on possible revisions to PCAOB standards related to reports on audited ﬁnancial statements and
related amendments to PCAOB standards’ (2011).
Table 7
Forms of address and board quality.
ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3] ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0018 0.94 0.0286 0.15 0.006 0.82 0.0335 0.09
DINDEP 0.0030 0.25 0.0028 0.28
DINDEP*ARF 0.0056 0.09 0.0061 0.06
COM 0.0061 0.03 0.0067 0.01
COM*ARF 0.0063 0.09 0.0052 0.13
ARF 0.0058 0.00 0.0052 0.01 0.0079 0.01 0.0064 0.02
UE 0.0861 0.00 0.0173 0.37 0.0862 0.00 0.0174 0.37
SIZE 0.0010 0.22 0.0024 0.00 0.0011 0.19 0.0025 0.00
n 12,064 11,969 12,064 11,969
F test 6.06*** 9.67*** 6.08*** 9.81***
R2 0.020 0.034 0.020 0.034
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Empirical evidence suggests that in emerging markets, independent audits and corporate governance sub-
stitute for each other as investor-protection mechanisms. For instance, Choi and Wong (2007) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
in weak legal environments have an incentive to hire high-quality auditors. Similarly, Fan and Wong (2005)
show that ﬁrms facing serious agency problems due to ultimate-ownership structure are more likely to hire
Big-5 auditors. In this section, I aim to determine whether the market response to real-name forms of address
is greater in ﬁrms with weak corporate governance. If so, it can be assumed that forms of address convey infor-
mation about audit quality. I use board quality as a measure of corporate governance because it concerns all
stakeholders in China’s stock market. As shown in Table 7, both DINDEP*ARF and COM*ARF are signif-
icantly negative, suggesting that the market response to real-name forms of address is greater when there are
fewer independent directors or board committees.
4.3. Eﬀects of forms of address on the relationship between audit risk factors and audit fees
In this section, I attempt to determine whether forms of address aﬀect the association between audit risk
factors and audit fees. Simunic (1980) posits that audit fees are positively related to audit risk factors because
auditors suﬀer the litigation costs associated with audit failure. I expect the coeﬃcients of the interaction of
ARF and the audit risk factors to be signiﬁcantly positive, in accordance with the power-solidarity eﬀect.
As shown in Table 8, the coeﬃcients of ARF*LOSS, ARF*SP and ARF*SEO support my conjecture. SP
and SEO capture the risk that the manager has an incentive to engage in earnings management to meet the
income target of the listing and seasoned equity oﬀering regulations. Therefore, the results suggest that audi-
tors that address clients by their real names are more concerned about earnings management.
4.4. Test of the role of signing auditors’ habits in determining forms of address
As shown in Table 4, some auditors use diﬀerent forms of address during the research period, while others
do not. Therefore, some forms of address may be driven by habit instead of choice. I deﬁne DUM as a dummy
variable denoting the eﬀect of habit. DUM is equal to 1 if the ﬁrst-signing auditor uses diﬀerent forms of
address during the research period, and 0 otherwise. I expect the coeﬃcient of DUM*ARF to be signiﬁcantly
positive, because the market response to a real-name address will be strong if forms of address are not
determined by habit. The results are shown in Table 9. Unfortunately, both DUM and DUM*ARF are
insigniﬁcant, indicating that DUM does not capture the eﬀect of habit.
Table 8
Test of audit fees.
Expected sign Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 5.2930 0.00
ARF ? 0.0554 0.02
ARF*ROA  0.2850 0.23
ARF*LOSS + 0.0988 0.02
ARF*SP + 0.0504 0.05
ARF*ARTA + 0.0286 0.78
ARF*BELOW + 0.4362 0.37
ARF*OCFTA + 0.0555 0.56
ARF*SEO + 0.0846 0.08
RSB  0.0058 0.00
ROA  0.4270 0.05
LOSS + 0.0378 0.29
SP + 0.0258 0.24
SEO + 0.0692 0.10
ARTA + 0.1569 0.09
INVTA ? 0.1769 0.00
GROW ? 0.0359 0.07
BELOW + 0.8255 0.05
OCFTA + 0.0481 0.55
STATE  0.0903 0.00
DE ? 0.0212 0.66
SIZE + 0.3595 0.00
n 10,101
F test 72.58***
R2 0.5667
Industry Controlled
Year Controlled
SEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ﬁrms whose returns on equity lie in the range [0.06, 0.065]; the p-values are based on standard
errors clustered by ﬁrm. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 9
Test of the role of auditors’ customary behavior in determining forms of address.
ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3] ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0005 0.99 0.0282 0.16 0.0023 0.93 0.0305 0.13
DUM 0.0008 0.61 0.0003 0.87 0.0010 0.70 0.0025 0.32
DUM*ARF 0.0029 0.39 0.0035 0.27
ARF 0.0034 0.05 0.0029 0.08 0.0051 0.04 0.0049 0.04
UE 0.0863 0.00 0.0173 0.37 0.0864 0.00 0.0175 0.36
SIZE 0.0010 0.22 0.0024 0.00 0.0011 0.20 0.0024 0.00
n 12,064 11,969 12,064 11,969
F test 6.23*** 9.95*** 6.09*** 9.69***
R2 0.020 0.034 0.020 0.034
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
DUM is equal to 1 if the ﬁrst signatory uses diﬀerent forms of address in the research period, and 0 otherwise; the p-values are based on
standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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The most commonly used window in event studies is [1, 1]. If the event is particular, the research
window is extended. For example, Sikes et al. (2014) use [2, 2] as a test window in which to investigate
Table 10
Tests using [1, 1] and [2, 2].
ACAR[2, 2] [2, 2] RCAR[2, 2] [2, 2] ACAR[1, 1] [1, 1] RCAR[1, 1] [1, 1]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0051 0.83 0.0272 0.11 0.0142 0.51 0.0279 0.03
ARF 0.0031 0.04 0.0024 0.09 0.0025 0.06 0.0018 0.12
UE 0.0743 0.01 0.0106 0.52 0.0550 0.03 0.0016 0.91
SIZE 0.0007 0.40 0.0020 0.00 0.0002 0.75 0.0018 0.00
n 12,064 11,969 12,064 11,969
F TEST 6.07*** 8.49*** 5.30*** 6.17***
R2 0.018 0.027 0.017 0.019
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 11
Consequences of forms of address; p-values based on Newey–West adjusted standard errors.
ACAR[3, 3] RCAR[3, 3]
Coeﬃcient p-Value Coeﬃcient p-Value
Intercept 0.0012 0.97 0.0280 0.19
ARF 0.0036 0.03 0.0029 0.07
UE 0.0862 0.00 0.0174 0.37
SIZE 0.0010 0.23 0.0024 0.00
n 12,064 11,969
Adjusted R2 0.0174 0.0313
Industry Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled
The p-values are based on Newey–West adjusted standard errors. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 4.
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ther, for two reasons. First, information leakage is possible in this environment. Second, all listed ﬁrms are
subject to a daily price limit on trading of 10%. To address these characteristics of the Chinese market,
Chen et al. (2009) use multiple test windows, such as [1, 1], [2, 2] and [5, 5]. Li (1999) and Chen and
Zhang (1999) all conduct tests with larger event windows. In this paper, I use [3, 3] as the main test window,
because the sample is composed solely of clean opinions, and the diﬀerences between forms of address are sub-
tle. However, to fully capture the market reaction to diﬀerent forms of address, I also use the windows [1, 1]
and [2, 2] in additional tests. The results are presented in Table 10. As shown in the table, shorter windows
give smaller coeﬃcients of ARF. When CAR is based on market-adjusted returns, the coeﬃcient of ARF drops
from 0.0031 to 0.0025 as the window shrinks from [2, 2] to [1, 1]. The results of tests using RCAR[2, 2] and
RCAR[1, 1] show similar trends. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the test of RCAR[1, 1] produces a signif-
icantly positive coeﬃcient of ARF (one-tailed test; p-value = 0.12), indicating that the evidence is weaker for
the [1, 1] window.
4.6. Statistics based on Newey–West adjusted standard errors
The p-values in the previous tests are based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. However, heteroskedastic
panel data may still lead to biased results. To rule out this possibility, I conduct a sensitivity test using the
method of standard-error adjustment recommended by Newey and West (1987). As shown in Table 11,
ARF is still signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that the results are robust to diﬀerently adjusted standard errors.
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This study investigates the consequences of auditors’ use of diﬀerent forms of address in the unique research
setting provided by the Chinese market. From 2003 to 2011, about 60% of the listed ﬁrms under study were
addressed by their real names in audit opinions, while the others received audit opinions featuring honoriﬁc
forms of address. Based on a sample of Chinese audit opinions, I report the following ﬁndings. First, there are
greater short-term responses to the announcement of audit opinions using real names than to audit opinions
featuring honoriﬁcs. Second, the market response to real-name opinions is stronger for ﬁrms with weak board
governance. Third, the association between audit fees and audit risk factors is stronger for ﬁrms that receive
audit opinions with real-name forms of address. The ﬁndings of this study provide further evidence on textual
disclosure via forms of address.
As many as 2000 years ago, nuanced words were used to convey profound meanings in the classic Chinese
text Chun qiu. More speciﬁcally, forms of address were used to convey the authors’ political opinions. The
results of the current study suggest that this traditional use of language has been preserved. This study also
sheds light on the signiﬁcance of the ﬂexibility of the Chinese language in modern ﬁnancial reports.
One limitation of this study is common to all studies of audit opinions. As the real process of auditing can-
not be observed, I was unable to test the possibility that auditors make adjustments to neutralize the negative
eﬀects of honoriﬁc address. This paper is also limited by the inability to identify items in the sample in which
forms of address reﬂect auditors’ customary practice rather than their choice. In future research, this limita-
tion could be addressed by surveying more transparent forms of disclosure or through experimental research.
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